Sunday, September 27, 2009

IED Training



Kandahar Airfield, Kandahar, Afghanistan-Lance Cpl. Matthew Castro, Marine Aerial Refueler Transport Squadron 352, Marine Aircraft Group 40, Marine Expeditionary Brigade Afghanistan armorer, observes a rock formation at the airfield's explosive ordnance disposal training course July 2. Castro and several other airfield Corporal's Course students took part in the one-day basic course. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Lance Cpl. Gregory Aalto), Lance Cpl. Gregory Aalto, 7/2/2009 7:29 AM


Marty's note: I missed this story from a few weeks ago but it's worth reading

MEB-Afghanistan Corporals Course Students Participate in Counter-IED Training
8/31/2009 By Lance Cpl. Gregory Aalto, Marine Aircraft Group 40


KANDAHAR AIRFIELD, Afghanistan —
Marine Attack Squadron 214 "Black Sheep" and Marine Aerial Refueler Transport Squadron 352/152 Detachment "A", all with Marine Aircraft Group 40, Marine Expeditionary Brigade-Afghanistan, Corporal's Course students attended a Counter-Improvised Explosive Device basic course here recently.

The one-day training focused strictly on current Afghanistan IED tactics used by enemy insurgents.

"Iraq and Afghanistan are two totally different [areas]. They shouldn't be mentioned in the same breath [in relation to IED use]," said Australian Army Sgt. Maj. Neil Patrick, the senior CIED instructor with NATO Regional Command South.

Patrick, who has 20 years of experience as an explosive ordnance disposal technician and multiple deployments to Ireland, Iraq and Afghanistan, added that one increased focus of the course is dealing with the post-IED blast reaction.

The course was directed by RC South for all service members here to attend.

"Ideally, this is the final stage of training, however for most, it is the beginning," said 1st Lt. Dan Pueda, CIED training officer in charge for Task Force Paladin.

As a nation, Afghanistan has an estimated 7-10 million pieces of unexploded ordnance left in the country, according to class instructors.

"I had a totally different picture of what a mine was in my head. [The class] gave me a whole new outlook to what a person on a patrol is facing," said Cpl. Kenneth Ducker, VMA-214 maintenance administration clerk.

Some additional training offered to Marines here includes medical training, an MRAP rollover trainer and a shooting simulator for various weapons and scenarios.

Sunday, September 20, 2009

Weather News from Afghanistan


Marines Test New Weather Sensor
Marine Aircraft Group 40
Story by Lance Cpl. Gregory Aalto
Date: 09.19.2009
Posted: 09.19.2009 08:38


KANDAHAR AIRFIELD, KANDAHAR PROVINCE, Afghanistan – Weather forecasters with Marine Expeditionary Brigade-Afghanistan continue to test the new expeditionary meteorological sensor weather observance system in southern Afghanistan during combat operations in the area.

In just a few months, these systems have provided more reliable and up-to-date information for mission planners to use in order to make planning adjustments due to inclement weather forecasts.

"In the past, reliable, real-time observational data came from a human being. Now we can emplace a sensor to perform that function," said Gunnery Sgt. Gregory Fairbank, a forecaster with Marine Wing Support Squadron 371, Marine Aircraft Group 40.

The system uses Iridium phone technology to send information to a satellite, which then relays the information to a Web site where forecasters can retrieve the data and provide updates to those Marines planning missions in the area.

Fairbanks added that the current system, the automated weather observing system, is still in use throughout Afghanistan while this new system is tested.

"Nothing beats the 'calibrated eye' of an observer on the ground, but the XMET helps out immensely with day-to-day operations," said Fairbank.

The $25,000 XMET system was developed by the Scripps Institution of Oceanography, a graduate school at the University of California, San Diego. Along with the updated information provided by the XMET, the simple and compact design cuts down on setup time from hours to minutes.

"I prefer the XMET over the old system. It's simple and comes in one box rather than four," said Cpl. Bryan Weingart II, a weather observer with MWSS-371.

For some of the weather observers throughout MEB-Afghanistan, this is their first deployment to a combat zone and the first time they've worked with this weather tracking and analysis gear. This new system has allowed them the opportunity to travel to various forward operating bases to set-up the XMET and see how the information gathered is used for mission planning.

"[Being a weather Marine] is essentially the same from garrison to a combat environment. This is the first time younger Marines actually get to see how their job fits into the big picture and how important it really is," said Fairbank.

This new system has been an added asset for MEB-Afghanistan weather forecasters to accurately track weather patterns throughout the area. Due to the success of recent tests, additional XMET systems are scheduled for use at additional bases as the MEB continues to operations in southern Afghanistan.

Thursday, September 17, 2009

Is this story already forgotten?


my note: Dear Main Stream Media - Is this not an important story?

Ambushed Marines' Aid Call 'Rejected'
September 10, 2009
Agence France-Presse


NATO-led forces are investigating the death of four Marines in eastern Afghanistan after their commanders reportedly rejected requests for artillery fire in a battle with insurgents, the Pentagon said on Wednesday.

Tuesday's incident was "under investigation" and details remained unclear, press secretary Geoff Morrell told a news conference.

A McClatchy newspapers' journalist who witnessed the battle reported that a team of Marine trainers made repeated appeals for air and artillery support after being pinned down by insurgents in the village of Ganjgal in eastern Kunar province.

The U.S. troops had to wait more than an hour for attack helicopters to come to their aid and their appeal for artillery fire was rejected, with commanders citing new rules designed to avoid civilian casualties, the report said.

Morrell said the helicopters were not hampered by any restrictions on air power but had to travel a long distance to reach the Marines at the remote location near the Pakistan border.

"I think that it did take some time for close air support to arrive in this case, but this is not a result of more restrictive conditions in which it can be used," he said.

"It was the result, as is often the case in Afghanistan, of the fact that there are great distances often between bases where such assets are located and where our troops are out operating."

Morrell could not confirm whether appeals for artillery fire were denied by commanders.

According to the McClatchy report by Jonathan Landay, the U.S. advisors assisting Afghan forces had been assured before the operation that "air cover would be five minutes away."

The incident comes after the top commander of U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan, General Stanley McChrystal, issued new restrictions on the use of military force and air raids in a bid to prevent civilian deaths.

McChrystal has warned that civilian casualties caused by the NATO-led force risk alienating the Afghan population and jeopardizing the war effort.

But the general and other top military officials have insisted air support and fire power would not be restricted when U.S. troops were under direct threat.

Bombing runs by coalition forces have declined sharply since McChrystal took over command in June, U.S.A Today reported on Wednesday, citing military statistics.

Tuesday's firefight in eastern Afghanistan involved a 13-member team of U.S. Marine and Army trainers assigned to the Afghan national army, the report said.

Eight Afghan soldiers and police and an Afghan interpreter also died in the battle, which lasted for hours with insurgents unleashing a barrage of gunfire and rockets from mountain positions, the report said.

When an Afghan soldier demanded helicopter gunships, U.S. Major Kevin Williams replied through an interpreter: "We are pinned down. We are running low on ammo. We have no air. We've lost today."

The Americans were assisting Afghan forces in an operation that called for Afghans searching the hamlet for weapons and then meeting village elders to plan police patrols.

But U.S. officers suspected insurgents were tipped off about the operation beforehand, as the coalition and Afghan forces were ambushed as they approached the outskirts of the hamlet at dawn, the report said.


© Copyright 2009 Agence France-Presse. All rights reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten or redistributed.

Wednesday, September 16, 2009

Harriers in Action


Story by Lance Cpl. Gregory Aalto
Date: 09.15.2009
Posted: 09.15.2009 09:06


KANDAHAR AIRFIELD, Kandahar Province, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan – A pair of AV-8B Harrier pilots directly assisted troops under enemy fire Aug. 8 in Garmsir, Helmand province.

Lt. Col. Eric Schaefer, commanding officer and Capt. Michael Plucinski, pilot, both with Marine Attack Squadron 214, Marine Aircraft Group 40, provided a low-altitude, high speed flight about 15 minutes after a group of Marines from 2nd Battalion, 8th Marine Regiment, became overwhelmed by enemy small-arms fire and indirect explosive attacks.

"Within 40 seconds of our show of force, the enemy disengaged," said Schaefer.
Plucinski provided support with use of the Harrier GAU-12 25mm cannon, which caused the insurgents to break contact long enough for the 2/8 Marine, with Regimental Combat Team 3, on the ground to coordinate mortar attacks, as close as 150 meters from their own positions.

"It seemed there was a lot of chaos down there," said Plucinski.

After a nearly 15 minute lull in the firefight, due to the presence of the Harriers, the enemy began to reengage. By this point the Marines already possessed the upper hand and overwhelmed the insurgent force.

"The situation was a textbook example of combined arms assisting the [infantrymen] to provide force protection," said Schaefer.

As Marine Expeditionary Brigade Afghanistan continues to push through the Helmand province, the support of VMA-214 proves vital in keeping Marines alive by intimidating insurgents with superior firepower.

A month after the squadron arrived to Afghanistan, Plucinski flew a similar mission to support ground troops engaged with enemy forces.

Mirroring the squadron's recent encounter, VMA-214 pilots arrived on a scene where ground troops became pinned down by enemy fire near Now Zad, Helmand province. This mission allowed Plucinski to fire the 25mm cannon for the first in combat in his career.

Since arriving in Afghanistan in May, VMA-214, nicknamed the "Black Sheep," has provided continuous aerial support by conducting approximately five missions a day in support of MEB-A in Helmand province.

The Black Sheep are scheduled to leave Afghanistan later this year and return to Marine Corps Air Station Yuma, Ariz. They plan to spend about a year at home before deploying again, this time with Marine Expeditionary Unit 31.

Tuesday, September 8, 2009

Sunday, September 6, 2009

"ISAF Commanders' Counterinsurgency Guidance" - McChrystal's Recent Directive to the Troops

Hi, all ... it's Pam making a rare post this morning.

For anyone who hasn't read the linked document, ISAF Commanders' Counterinsurgency Guidance, I'd encourage you to do so.

It's extremely well-written, easy to understand, and provides tangible examples of counterinsurgency theory in practical application. Whether you agree with it or not, you'll walk away knowing a little more than you did at breakfast this morning ... and that's never a bad thing.

Thursday, September 3, 2009

William Kristol's Reply To George Will

No Will, No Way
George Will is dismayed by American casualties in Afghanistan, unhappy about the length of our effort there, dismissive of the contributions of our NATO allies, contemptuous of the Afghan central government, and struck by the country’s backwardness.

I share many of these sentiments. But they are sentiments. It would be better to base a major change in our national security strategy on arguments--especially if you’re advocating a change from a policy that’s been supported for eight years by a bipartisan consensus, and that involves the area that was the staging ground for Sept. 11.

Will does seem to allow that we have a core national interest in Afghanistan--“to prevent re-establishment of al-Qaeda bases” there. He then makes a recommendation that would presumably achieve that goal--that “forces should be substantially reduced to serve a comprehensively revised policy: America should do only what can be done from offshore, using intelligence, drones, cruise missiles, air strikes and small, potent special forces units, concentrating on the porous 1,500-mile border with Pakistan.”

But would this succeed in preventing the re-establishment of terror bases? This “comprehensively revised policy” doesn't sound much more engaged than U.S. Afghan policy in the 1990s. Will would have to explain why it would work better this time--or why the price of failure wouldn’t be higher than the price of continuing to prosecute the war with a revised counterinsugency strategy of the sort Gen. Stanley McChrystal has suggested.

Well, perhaps a counter-insurgency strategy simply can’t work. Writes Will: “Counterinsurgency theory concerning the time and the ratio of forces required to protect the population indicates that, nationwide, Afghanistan would need hundreds of thousands of coalition troops, perhaps for a decade or more. That is inconceivable.”

But as the military historian Fred Kagan explains, counter-insurgency theory and experience suggest that if the Afghan National Army is expanded, as Gen. McChrystal proposes to do, and if there is a surge of several brigades of American forces “to bridge the gap between current Afghan capacity and their future capacity, while simultaneously reducing the insurgency’s capabilities,” then we would have roughly the number of forces necessary to carry out the strategy.

Will acknowledges in passing what seems to be another important national interest--Pakistan, “a nation that actually matters.” But Will never tries to show--counterintuitively--that retreat from Afghanistan would increase rather than decrease the chances of an acceptable outcome in Pakistan. And this is to say nothing of the broader consequences of defeat in the Afghan theater in the war against the jihadists. If the United States of America is driven out of Afghanistan by the Taliban, the group that hosted the Sept. 11 attackers--what then?

Will closes with an appeal to Charles de Gaulle: “Genius, said de Gaulle, recalling Bismarck's decision to halt German forces short of Paris in 1870, sometimes consists of knowing when to stop. Genius is not required to recognize that in Afghanistan, when means now, before more American valor...is squandered.”

But let’s be honest. Will is not calling on the United
States to accept a moderate degree of success in Afghanistan, and simply to stop short of some overly ambitious goal. Will is urging retreat, and accepting defeat.

As Will says, we have sent America’s finest to fight in Afghanistan. It is true that we have under-resourced and poorly strategized that fight. The right way to keep faith with our soldiers and Marines is for our national leaders now to support a strategy, and to provide the necessary resources, for victory.

Tuesday, September 1, 2009

Time to Get Out of Afghanistan

Time to Get Out of Afghanistan


By George F. Will
Tuesday, September 1, 2009

"Yesterday," reads the e-mail from Allen, a Marine in Afghanistan, "I gave blood because a Marine, while out on patrol, stepped on a [mine's] pressure plate and lost both legs." Then "another Marine with a bullet wound to the head was brought in. Both Marines died this morning."

"I'm sorry about the drama," writes Allen, an enthusiastic infantryman willing to die "so that each of you may grow old." He says: "I put everything in God's hands." And: "Semper Fi!"

Allen and others of America's finest are also in Washington's hands. This city should keep faith with them by rapidly reversing the trajectory of America's involvement in Afghanistan, where, says the Dutch commander of coalition forces in a southern province, walking through the region is "like walking through the Old Testament."

U.S. strategy -- protecting the population -- is increasingly troop-intensive while Americans are increasingly impatient about "deteriorating" (says Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) conditions. The war already is nearly 50 percent longer than the combined U.S. involvements in two world wars, and NATO assistance is reluctant and often risible.

The U.S. strategy is "clear, hold and build." Clear? Taliban forces can evaporate and then return, confident that U.S. forces will forever be too few to hold gains. Hence nation-building would be impossible even if we knew how, and even if Afghanistan were not the second-worst place to try: The Brookings Institution ranks Somalia as the only nation with a weaker state.


Military historian Max Hastings says Kabul controls only about a third of the country -- "control" is an elastic concept -- and " 'our' Afghans may prove no more viable than were 'our' Vietnamese, the Saigon regime." Just 4,000 Marines are contesting control of Helmand province, which is the size of West Virginia. The New York Times reports a Helmand official saying he has only "police officers who steal and a small group of Afghan soldiers who say they are here for 'vacation.' " Afghanistan's $23 billion gross domestic product is the size of Boise's. Counterinsurgency doctrine teaches, not very helpfully, that development depends on security, and that security depends on development. Three-quarters of Afghanistan's poppy production for opium comes from Helmand. In what should be called Operation Sisyphus, U.S. officials are urging farmers to grow other crops. Endive, perhaps?

Even though violence exploded across Iraq after, and partly because of, three elections, Afghanistan's recent elections were called "crucial." To what? They came, they went, they altered no fundamentals, all of which militate against American "success," whatever that might mean. Creation of an effective central government? Afghanistan has never had one. U.S. Ambassador Karl Eikenberry hopes for a "renewal of trust" of the Afghan people in the government, but the Economist describes President Hamid Karzai's government -- his vice presidential running mate is a drug trafficker -- as so "inept, corrupt and predatory" that people sometimes yearn for restoration of the warlords, "who were less venal and less brutal than Mr. Karzai's lot."

Mullen speaks of combating Afghanistan's "culture of poverty." But that took decades in just a few square miles of the South Bronx. Gen. Stanley McChrystal, the U.S. commander in Afghanistan, thinks jobs programs and local government services might entice many "accidental guerrillas" to leave the Taliban. But before launching New Deal 2.0 in Afghanistan, the Obama administration should ask itself: If U.S. forces are there to prevent reestablishment of al-Qaeda bases -- evidently there are none now -- must there be nation-building invasions of Somalia, Yemen and other sovereignty vacuums?

U.S. forces are being increased by 21,000, to 68,000, bringing the coalition total to 110,000. About 9,000 are from Britain, where support for the war is waning. Counterinsurgency theory concerning the time and the ratio of forces required to protect the population indicates that, nationwide, Afghanistan would need hundreds of thousands of coalition troops, perhaps for a decade or more. That is inconceivable.

So, instead, forces should be substantially reduced to serve a comprehensively revised policy: America should do only what can be done from offshore, using intelligence, drones, cruise missiles, airstrikes and small, potent Special Forces units, concentrating on the porous 1,500-mile border with Pakistan, a nation that actually matters.

Genius, said de Gaulle, recalling Bismarck's decision to halt German forces short of Paris in 1870, sometimes consists of knowing when to stop. Genius is not required to recognize that in Afghanistan, when means now, before more American valor, such as Allen's, is squandered.

georgewill@washpost.com